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INTRODUCTION 
Appellant Arnold Industries Inc.'s (herein after "Arnold") claim against Salt Lake County 
and the Salt Lake County Recorder (herein after jointly the "County") was timely, because notice 
thereof was given within one year of when Arnold knew or should have known of Arnold's 
claim against the County. 
In classic armchair quarter back fashion, the County claims that the discovery of its error 
should have been discovered within two weeks of Loves' first claim of an easement. In so 
arguing, the County ignores the glaring fact that its own abstract administrator failed to learn of 
the negligence until more than fifteen months after receiving Arnold's detailed notice of claim, 
and only then after having the nature of the error explained to her in deposition. The County's 
error was the result of a procedural omission, which by its very nature and context was self-
obscuring and self-concealing. Under the facts of this case one hundred and fourteen days was 
not an unreasonable time in which to discover the County's error. 
In addition, the trial court penalized Arnold for settlement efforts, which delayed 
Arnold's discovery of the County's error. Finally, and in the alternative, the fact that the 
County's abstract administrator did not discover the error until her deposition fifteen months 
after Arnold's notice of claim creates an issue of fact, which precluded summary judgment in 
favor of the county. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. ARNOLD'S CLAIM AGAINST THE COUNTY DID NOT ACCRUE AT 
THE TIME OF THE COUNTY'S NEGLIGENCE IN 1991 BECAUSE 
ARNOLD HELD NO INTEREST IN THE PROPERTY AT THAT TIME. 
It is undisputed that the County's negligence in abstracting the 1991 Corrective 
Warranty Deed occurred in January or February 1991. (Appellees' Br. at 8.) Relying 
upon this fact, the County makes an unsupportable argument that Arnold's claim against 
the County arose at that time. However, Arnold's claim against the County could not 
have arisen in 1991 because Arnold did not yet own an interest in the property and hence, 
was not damaged by the negligence. 
[Mjost of Utah's statutes of limitations do not begin to run until the plaintiffs 
cause of action "accrues." We have generally interpreted a cause of action to 
"accrue" only when the plaintiff discovers or should have discovered the injury or 
damage. 
Hooper Water Improvement Dist. v. Reeve, 642 P.2d 745, 747 (Utah 1982) (Howe, J. 
concurring). Arnold did not own the property in 1991 and therefore was not damaged by 
the County's negligence until later. Accordingly, no cause of action accrued in 1991. 
II. ARNOLD GAVE NOTICE OF ITS CLAIM WITHIN ONE YEAR OF 
WHEN IT ACTUALLY KNEW OF THE COUNTY'S NEGLIGENCE. 
Arnold first became aware of the County's error in abstracting the Corrective 
Warranty Deed on July 2, 1997. Arnold gave notice to the County approximately one 
2 
month later, on August 4, 1997. Therefore, the undisputed facts of this case show that 
Arnold gave notice to the County well within one year of actually knowing of the claim. 
III. ARNOLD GAVE NOTICE TO THE COUNTY WITHIN ONE YEAR OF 
WHEN ARNOLD "SHOULD HAVE KNOWN" OF ITS CLAIM AGAINST 
THE COUNTY. 
Having shown that Arnold gave notice of its claim within one year of actual 
knowledge, the next consideration is when Arnold should have known of the claim. 
Utah's Governmental Immunity statute requires that notice of a claim be presented within 
one year after the claim arises. U.C.A. § 63-30-13 (1965). This Court has held that "the 
limitations period 'does not commence to run until the injured person knew or should 
have known that he had sustained an injury and that the injury was caused by negligent 
action.'" Seale v. Gowans, 923 P.2d 1361, 1363 (Utah 1996) (quoting Foil v. Ballinger, 
601 P.2d 144, 148 (Utah 1979) (emphasis added). 
A specific inquiry is required as to whether Arnold was under a duty to discover 
the County's negligence in less than 114 days, or before August 4, 1996. This is because 
the statute of limitations began to run when Arnold should have known of its claim 
against the County. Because Arnold was required to give notice within one year of that 
hypothetical date, if Arnold had discovered the County's negligence on August 4, 1996, 
its notice of claim to the County on August 4, 1997 was timely. See, Wilcox v. Geneva 
Rock Corp., 911 P.2d 367, 369 (Utah 1996) ("When the time period is measured in 
months or years from a certain date, the day from which the time period is to run is 
excluded and the same calendar date of the final month or year is included", citing 
3 
Gilroy v. Lowe, 626 P.2d 469, 471 (Utah 1981)). There are 114 days between the date 
Loves' claimed an easement and August 4, 1996—one year before notice was given the 
County. Thus, stated otherwise the issue is, nDid the trial court error in holding Arnold to 
a duty to discover the County's negligence in less than 114 days, or before August 4, 
1996?" For the reasons set forth below Arnold respectfully asserts that the trial court 
erred. 
A. The Mere Existence of the Corrective Warranty Deed Was Not 
Evidence of the County's Negligence. 
The fact that Loves possessed a document which purported to effect the Arnold 
property was not evidence of negligence by the County. Moreover, it did not justify 
exclusion of other possible, and more likely explanations as to why the 1991 Corrective 
Warranty Deed had remained undetected in Arnold's title searches. Loves first claimed 
an easement on April 12, 1996. Yet there is nothing in the 1991 Corrective Warranty 
Deed that points exclusively to the County's negligence as the sole cause of Arnold's 
inability to discover the deed. As noted in Arnold's principal brief, when viewed from 
the perspective of April 12, 1996, the fact that Arnold's 1993 title examination failed to 
locate the 1991 Corrective Deed was more readily explained as an error on the part of the 
title examiners, as opposed to negligent abstraction to the tract index by the County. 
(Appellant's Br. at 50) (see also, R. at 1079). Initial suspicion would not point to the 
County because title examiners justifiably presume the accuracy of those records due to 
the County's statutory duty to disclose. (R. at 1079.) Contrary to the County's argument, 
there is nothing in the mere existence of the 1991 Corrective Warranty Deed that 
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exclusively points to the County's negligence. Such negligence was a single, remote 
possibility, after other more likely explanations were exhausted. The Court must decide 
whether Arnold should have eliminated the other possible causes and identified the 
County as the sole culprit before August 4, 1996, one year before making the claim. 
B. The County Offered No Evidence As To Why Arnold "Should Have 
Known" Of Its Claim In Less Than 114 Days. 
The County further asserts that its error could have been discovered by Arnold 
within two weeks. (Appellees' Br. at 11.) It may be true that under a hypothetical fact 
scenario, the error could have been discovered within two weeks. There may be an 
infinite number of situations in which the County's error could have been discovered, 
either sooner or later. But hypotheticals do not address the question of whether, under 
the facts of this case, Arnold should have discovered the County's error before August 4, 
1996, or in less than 114 days from the date of Loves' first claim. The County presented 
no evidence on this issue. 
This matter was before the trial court on the County's motion to dismiss. In 
response to the County's motion Arnold submitted affidavits. Thereafter, the trial court 
treated the motion as one for summary judgment, pursuant to Rule 56 U.R.C.P.1 In this 
procedural setting, the County presented no evidence as to why Arnold should have 
identified the negligence in less than 114 days, and did not raise any issue as to Arnold's 
1
 "If, on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of the 
pleadings to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the pleadings 
are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for 
summary judgment...." U.R.C.P. Rule 12 (b). 
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facts. (R. at 1246-55.) Rather, the County simply pointed to the deed and argued without 
testimony or evidence. Therefore, the undisputed facts proven by Arnold are the only 
record for purposes of the motion to dismiss and for this appeal. 
C. The County's Assertion That The Negligence Should Have been 
Discovered Within Two Weeks is Without Merit 
The "heart" of the County's motion is that "high powered legal talent and expertise 
. . . dropped the ball," (Appellees' Br. at 14), and that Arnold's assertion that it had no 
reason to suspect the County's negligence cannot "be made with a straight face." 
(Appellees, Br. at 15.) The County makes this argument in the absence of evidence, and 
with the luxury of pure, unadulterated retrospection. The argument assumes that Arnold's 
counsel labored under no other demands or requirements other than to suspect the County 
and exhaust the various theories by which it might have caused this problem—to the 
exclusion of the more usual suspects. 
The County is simply "Monday morning quarter-backing." Its position evidences 
a lack of understanding, both of the complexity of analysis and the fact investigation 
which counsel was required to conduct when Loves first claimed an easement. (R. at 
1131-1177.) Moreover, the County's assumption that Arnold could immediately obtain 
and reconcile all of the documents in both Loves' and Arnold's twisted chains of title, is 
unrealistic. In light of testimony by the County's own witness, Marlene Peterson, it is 
also hypocritical. 
Ms. Peterson is the abstract administrator for the Salt Lake County Recorder and 
oversees the maintenance of the official indices of the Salt Lake County Recorder's 
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office. (R. at 614.) If the negligence was as obvious and apparent as the County claims, 
and if it could have been so readily discovered by Arnold within two weeks of the Loves1 
claim of easement, surely the County's abstract administrator would have been aware of 
this error within two weeks of Arnold's notice of claim to the County. Perhaps the 
County should have even discovered its error in the eight years from the time of the error 
to the date of Ms. Peterson's deposition, when the mistake laid so "obviously" upon its 
own records. (Appellees' Br. at 14.). 
But the facts show that Marlene Peterson didn't know of the County's omission 
until the day of her deposition, December 10, 1998, and then only after that error was 
specifically pointed out and explained to her by Arnold's counsel. (R. at 1074-76.) This 
was nearly eight years after the County's negligence, fifteen months after the County had 
been served with Arnold's notice of claim, and four months after the County was made a 
party to this law suit. 
The County's position is further undermined by an examination of Arnold's notice 
of claim. This is because the notice of claim specifically described the facts that 
constituted the County's negligence. In pertinent part the notice states: 
[Arnold's title examination of the County records] failed to show the 
[Loves'] easement due to the failure of the Salt Lake County Recorder to 
properly abstract or index the Corrective Warranty Deed to [the Arnold 
property]. 
(R. at 948-50) (emphasis added). Yet, even as late as the time of her deposition, the 
County's abstract administrator had not identified the error. Her testimony is as follows: 
7 
Doesn't this [RXAU print out] tell me how the corrective 
warranty deed has been indexed by the county recorder's 
office? 
Yes. 
Okay. Or, I should say, it tells me how that corrective 
warranty deed has been abstracted by the county recorder's 
office as well? 
Yes. 
Okay. Now, does this document tell me that the corrective 
warranty deed, Book 6284, Page 1366, has been 
abstracted to the Arnold property? 
Well, it does if you look at the parcel number—or no. No, 
it doesn't. Parcel number isn't there. No, it doesn't. 
Okay. And that's because it shows that it's been 
abstracted to parcel number 15-21-226-006; is that 
correct? 
Yes. 
And if you will look at Exhibit 4, are you able to discern what 
the parcel number for the Love property is? 
Yes, uh-huh (Affirmative). 
And that is the parcel number for the Love property, 15-
21-226-006, is it not? 
That's right. 
* * * 
This RXAU entry or RXAU record does not show that the 
corrective warranty deed, Book 6284, page 1366, was 
abstracted to the Arnold property, does it? 
It doesn't tell me that, no. 
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(R. at 1074-76.) (emphasis added). 
The County's position that counsel "dropped the ball" for taking 114 days to 
discover the recording error is overshadowed by the fact that the County's own abstract 
administrator failed to recognize the County's negligence. 
D. Utah Cases, Sevy v. Security Title and Klinger v. Kightly Support 
Arnold's Position. 
The truth of the matter is that the abstracting of documents at the County 
Recorder's office is an obscure, arcane, and esoteric process, which few people 
understand or care about.2 As shown in Klinger v. Kightly, 791 P.2d 868 (Utah 1990) 
(dealing with a property survey) and Sevy v. Security Title, 902 P.2d 629 (Utah 1995) 
(concerning the perfection of a security interest in water rights), abstracting and indexing 
of documents by the Recorder requires "technical knowledge and yields intangible 
results" and Arnold had "no reason to suspect that [the County's records . . . were] 
inaccurate." Sevy, 902 P.2d at 636, (citing Klinger, 791 P.2d at 872). Moreover, title 
examiners do not investigate the process that the Recorder's office follows when 
abstracting and indexing a document. (R. at 1078-79.) Rather, title examiners presume 
the accuracy of the County's efforts and only examine the end result of those processes. 
(R. at 1079.) If the process results in an error, there is no indication from the official 
record whereby an examiner would know that an abstract or an index is faulty. 
2
 This is the case notwithstanding the critical importance of these County functions. In 
order to be valid as against third parties without notice, every real estate transaction from 
the smallest estate to the largest commercial venture must be properly recorded. U.C.A. 
§57-3-3. 
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Indeed, the County's negligence in this case was only discovered through an 
examination of the process by which the County abstracted the Corrective Warranty 
Deed. The error was discovered in the RXAU record. (R. at 1077.) This is not an 
official record. (R. at 1074, 1253.) Rather, it is the computer screen through which the 
County enters data from an instrument. (R. at 1074, 1053.) In this case it took an 
examination of how the County had processed the Corrective Warranty Deed to discover 
the County's negligence. 
Because "the task of [abstracting] requires technical knowledge not possessed by 
people in general, and the nature of this task is such that a negligent failure to perform it 
properly may not be discovered until years later," (Sevy, 902 P.2d at 636), the trial court 
erred in holding that Arnold's notice to the County was not timely. 
IV. THE PARTIES1 SETTLEMENT EFFORTS ARE RELEVANT TO WHEN 
ARNOLD KNEW OR SHOULD HAVE KNOWN OF THE COUNTY'S 
NEGLIGENCE. 
As noted earlier, the precise question before this Court is whether the trial court 
erred as a matter of law in concluding that 114 days was too much time for Arnold to 
discover the County's negligence. In addressing the early discussions between the 
parties, the County argues that "a statute of limitations has never been tolled to allow the 
parties time to negotiate." (Appellees' Br. at 15.) However, the issue before the Court is 
when the limitations period began to run—in other words, when Arnold should have 
discovered the County's negligence—not the date on which the limitations period ended. 
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In this consideration, the discussions which affected Arnold's pursuit of a source of the 
omission in the County's records are significant. 
As pointed out in Arnold's principal brief, and as shown by the written 
correspondence included in the addendum thereto, the discussions between counsel were 
real, and the potential claims were significant. Thus, the research attendant to those 
discussions focused upon identifying issues and claims between the parties—not the 
origins of an omission in the County's records. 
In the Court's consideration of when Arnold knew or should have known of the 
County's negligence, the obscure and evasive nature of that error must be considered in 
the context of the circumstances surrounding the interested parties. The issue is not what 
could have happened under ideal circumstances, but what was reasonable under the 
circumstances of this case. Arnold asserts that its discovery of the source of the error was 
within a reasonable time, under the circumstances. The determination as to when a party 
should have discovered an injury is a matter of law—subject to the facts presented. In 
this case the facts did not support the trial court's ruling, and the practical effect of that 
court's ruling was to penalize Arnold for its genuine efforts to identify the issues and 
claims and negotiate toward settlement, rather than rushing to court with broad claims 
against every conceivable entity. 
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V. ALTERNATIVELY, ISSUES OF FACT PRECLUDED SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE COUNTY. 
As has been noted above, the County presented no evidence to support its 
contention that Arnold should have discovered the County's negligence in less than 114 
days after the Loves first claimed an easement. Rather, the County rested and relied upon 
the pleadings. 
Arnold, on the other hand, presented affidavits, deposition testimony, and exhibits 
to the trial court which explained and demonstrated the circumstances and context of its 
discovery of the County's error. That evidence and testimony showed that the error was 
an omission and difficult to identify. It also showed that the dialogue which rose between 
Arnold and Loves upon Loves first claiming an easement was intense, and research 
continued as that dialogue evolved. Despite Arnold's thorough analysis related to the on-
going discussions with Loves', it was not until standard title search methodology was 
exhausted that further investigation into the recording procedures permitted discovery of 
the County's omission. The trial court ignored these undisputed facts. 
At the very least, the fact that the County took more than fifteen months to identify 
its own error, after specific notice of a claim from Arnold, creates an issue of fact which 
should have precluded the trial court from entering summary judgment against Arnold. 
This is particularly true in light of the requirement that all evidence and reasonable 
inferences arising therefrom are to be construed in fay;or of the non-moving party, 
Arnold. 
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CONCLUSION 
The trial erred as a matter of law in ruling that Arnold should have discovered the 
County's negligence in less than 114 days. Notice of Loves' claim of easement was not 
notice or evidence of the County's error. Rather, the claim of an easement initiated a 
dialogue focused on identifying and resolving claims between Arnold and Loves. 
Discovery of the County's omission came only as those discussions evolved and after 
standard title research methodology was exhausted, and an investigation was made of 
recording processes. 
The trial court's ruling penalized Arnold for taking the time to investigate before 
filing a claim. At the very least, the County's own inability to identify its error in fifteen 
months after the Arnold's notice of claim raises an issue of fact as to the reasonableness 
of Arnold's discovery. This should have precluded summary judgment in favor of Loves. 
In light of the undisputed and proven facts presented by Arnold, Arnold respectfully 
requests that this Court reverse the trial court, so as to allow further proceedings in this 
matter. 
ay of November, 2001. 
IVIE & YOUNG 
Sherman C. Young 
Attorney for Appellant 
BiHO.Heder 
Attorney for Appellant 
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